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RESUMEN 
En este artículo voy a estudiar la posibilidad de un tipo de conocimiento a priori 
que sirve a los intereses de la metafísica, asumiendo que la metafísica entraña la búsqueda 
de conocimiento modal. El conocimiento necesario, o mejor, modal es a priori; luego el 
conocimiento metafísico es de igual modo a priori. Defenderé que la intuición es el 
camino hacia el conocimiento modal en metafísica, insistiendo en que el conocimiento o 
la posible concepción de verdades conceptuales no lleva al reino modal de la metafísica. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I consider the possibility of a kind of a priori cognition that serves 
the purposes of metaphysics, given that metaphysics involves the search for modal 
knowledge. Necessary or, better, modal knowledge is a priori; so metaphysical knowledge 
is likewise a priori. Here I argue that intuition is the route to modal knowledge in 
metaphysics, and I insist that conceivability or knowledge of conceptual truths does not 
lead towards the modal realm of metaphysics.  
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I. A POSTERIORI NECESSARY TRUTHS 
 
Before entering into the main discussion of the paper, I need to say 
a word on the aprioricity of modal metaphysical knowledge. It is usually 
understood that Kripke dispelled the possible link between modal truths, 
especially those concerning metaphysics, and a priori truths. He showed 
how we might come to know a posteriori necessary truths that are essen-
tially metaphysical in character. Thus, modality does not seem to be a 
privilege reserved for a priori knowledge; it can be empirically known. 
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However, even if there is something true in this train of thought, it 
also goes beyond a fundamental fact that Kripke also maintained: that a 
posteriori knowledge of modal truths requires, in all cases, a priori modal 
knowledge concerning some fundamental category that a posteriori 
truths exemplify. To know a posteriori that it is necessary that Hesperus 
is Phosphorus requires the a priori principle that identity is necessary. In 
all the cases of necessary a posteriori truths considered by Kripke, 
knowledge of their necessity is a priori: philosophical investigation tells 
us that they are necessarily true, even when their truth is known a posterio-
ri. A priori philosophical investigation into the nature of mathematics 
and mathematical reasoning, resolves its necessity – and this is so, irre-
spective of whether the truth/falsity of particular mathematical state-
ments (say, Fermat’s theorem) is known a priori or a posteriori. A priori 
philosophical investigation into the nature of identity resolves its necessi-
ty – and this is so, irrespective of whether the truth/falsity of particular 
statements of identity (say, that Hesperus is Phosphorus) is known a pri-
ori or a posteriori. A priori philosophical investigation into the relation be-
tween genus and species resolves its necessity – and this is so, irrespective 
of whether the truth/falsity of particular statements predicating the belong-
ing of a given species to a genus (say, that cats are demons) is known a pri-
ori or a posteriori, and so on.1 Knowledge of truth and modal knowledge 
must be distinguished, and the latter can only be attained in an a priori 
manner. The question that guides this paper concerns the kind of a priori 
philosophical investigation that provides modal/necessary knowledge, 
such as that advocated in Kripkean texts. In the next sections I argue 
that knowledge of conceptual truths and conceivability are not well-
suited to this philosophical job.  
 
 
II. ON NECESSITY BY MEANING 
 
Many philosophers, especially in the recent past, have actively 
argued against the possibility of any kind of a priori investigation that 
provides knowledge in metaphysics. Even though many of their ideas 
have already been subjected to more in-depth analysis than I offer here, 
their conceptions of aprioricity will illuminate the discussion.  
Carnap (1931) famously reasoned that necessary, and thus a priori, 
truths must be conventional; that is, analytic; that is, about language 
rather than reality. Metaphysics, a supposedly a priori examination of the 
structure of the world, is an illusion brought about by careless use of 
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language – to put it charitably. A priori knowledge is knowledge of 
analytic truths. Why? Because knowledge of the world can be produced 
only by a posteriori, empirical procedures – this is a defining thesis of 
positivism. If there were a priori truths or falsities at all, they would not 
be about the world. Rather they would be mere analytic sentences: 
sentences devoid of factual content, whose trivial truth/falsity depends 
on conventional meaning alone.  
Quine went further than Carnap and attacked not only a priori 
truths in metaphysics, but also analyticity; and thereby the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction itself. His celebrated argument in “Two Dogmas” 
claims that the Frege/Carnap conception of analytic truths as those 
reducible via definition, or synonymy, to truths of logic, is viciously 
circular – for definitions are conceptual truths. So, given that a priori 
knowledge is knowledge of analytic truths, there is no non-circular 
notion of a priori. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori 
truths is another dogma of empiricism.  
It is important, however, to bear in mind that for Quine, just as for 
Carnap, a priori truths, if there are any, are true by convention. Since 
Carnap and Quine, considerations concerning metaphysics have evolved. 
Nowadays, not so many people agree that metaphysics is nonsensical. 
There is even a rather reputable approach in metaphysics that could be 
called post-Carnapian metaphysics. Post-Carnapians take the thesis that a 
priori knowledge is analytic as their starting point and then try to rescue 
some notion of analyticity from the Quinean critique, in order to defend 
the possibility of metaphysics. Such philosophers work with a new 
conception of analyticity, different from that of Carnap and Quine, so that 
they can save a priori knowledge from the Quinean charge of circularity. 
Such a new conception of analyticity, in providing new understanding of 
the a priori, would then constitute the epistemological foundation of 
modal knowledge in logic and mathematics, as well as in metaphysics. 
Much of the new metametaphysics project is grounded on these ideas.2  
In general, the main argument against “old” analyticity is its 
conventional character. It seemed obvious to Carnap that matters of 
meaning are matters regarding generally implicit conventions about our 
use of words. And this is precisely where Quine attacked analyticity. Quine 
claimed, first, that conventions of meaning and definitions fall foul of 
circularity; and, second, that if meaning is not conventional, the idea that the 
a priori is involved in meaning is hard to swallow. An underlying general 
point throughout this paper is that Quine’s second claim has not been 
considered sufficiently. Thus, new ways of understanding analytic truths 
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can be found, such that truth by meaning includes non-conventional 
aspects, or facts about the world. There can be new ways of adding 
factual material together to arrive at meaning. But then the a priori 
character of analytic truths, and with it the aprioricity that seems essential 
for modal knowledge, will be seriously threatened. 
I claim that metaphysics is not a question of semantics. This reminds 
me of a joke I once heard from a philosopher of logic: it is obviously false 
that necessarily all bachelors are unmarried men, as most of them get 
married. The point is, of course, that one should not confuse use with 
mention. In the statement that, necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried 
men, necessity applies to the name of the statement: it does not apply in its 
content. Thus, even if it is true that, necessarily, all bachelors are 
unmarried men, nothing in this makes it impossible for bachelors to 
marry; as they normally do. It could be that synonymy or analyticity are 
not such obscure phenomena; but Quine is right that there is no way one 
can get metaphysical, necessary knowledge from knowledge of analytic 
truths without confounding the predicate of necessity with a statement 
operator. Necessity from meaning cannot be translated into necessity de re.3  
In other words, either analytic truths or truths by meaning are 
truths by convention, or meaning is understood along factual lines. In 
the former case, a priori knowledge becomes as problematic as 
analyticity, and equally devoid of factual/metaphysical content. In the 
latter, the relevant aspect of meaning that covers factuality is not a priori 
but a posteriori. Either way, analyticity cannot provide for modal 
knowledge in metaphysics.  
Through consideration of a particular approach, I hope to clarify 
my argument. One well-known proposal that illustrates how to arrive at 
metaphysical truths from conceptual truths is Jackson’s (1998). The 
proposal essentially consists of defending inferences such as the 
following. Given the conceptual claim that: 
 
Pr. 1 Water = the liquid that we drink, that is in our rivers, etc.,  
[Conceptual claim] 
 
and the empirical discovery that: 
 
Pr. 2 The liquid that we drink, that is in our rivers, etc. = H2O,  
[Empirical discovery] 
 
we can infer, by the transitivity of ‘=’, the metaphysically necessary claim 
that: 
The Role of Intuition in Metaphysics                                                            83 
 
Conc. Water = H2O. 
 
The problem is that there seems to be no clear sense in which the neces-
sity of Pr. 1 can help us to know that Conc. is metaphysically necessary. 
Note that there are four different readings of Pr. 1 (a – d, below), and that 
Pr. 1 is necessary in only two of them, as I now elucidate. 
 
(a) ‘=’ is flanked by a rigid designator, ‘water’, and a definite de-
scription that has a narrow scope: the sentence is a priori and contingent. 
This would correspond to the sense in which Kripke argued that ‘One 
meter is the length of bar B at t1’ is a priori and contingent. That is, there 
would have been a moment at which somebody said: “Let’s call the liq-
uid that we drink, that is in our rivers, etc. ‘water’”. He would thus know 
a priori Pr. 1; but then, even if a priori, it is clearly contingent that water 
is the liquid that we drink, that is in our rivers, etc. When giving it its 
name, our subject would be pointing to our water stuff, which is not 
necessarily the liquid that is in our rivers, etc. So, being contingent, Pr. 1 
cannot be the route to the metaphysical necessity of Conc.  
 
(b) ‘=’ in Pr. 1 is flanked by a rigid designator, ‘water’, and a definite 
description that has a narrow scope; but the context is not one in which 
somebody introduces a rigid designator, but rather a context in which he 
is merely pointing out true properties of the rigidly designated entity. In 
this sense, Pr. 1 is a posteriori and contingent. Again, being contingent, it 
cannot be a route to the metaphysical necessity of Conc.  
 
(c) There is also a reading of Pr. 1 where it is necessary and a poste-
riori. This would be the reading in which the definite description has a 
wide scope; i.e., Pr. 1 is necessary because necessarily water is that entity 
which is (contingently) the liquid that we drink, that is in our rivers, etc. 
However, thus read, Pr. 1 cannot be a route to the metaphysical necessity 
of Conc., because the information that water is the liquid that we drink, 
that is in our rivers, etc., is synthetic, contingent and a posteriori. (Thus 
necessity belongs in the fact that that entity is water; i.e., necessity be-
longs in the metaphysical relation of identity.) 
 
(d) In the most anti-Kripkean reading of all, Pr. 1 could be under-
stood as a conceptual truth, i.e., a pure definition of ‘water’, as in a dic-
tionary. Pr. 1 would then be necessary and a priori, but useless for any 
epistemological purpose concerning the nature of our world. I think that 
this is in fact the reading that Jackson intends; but it is fruitless. For in this 
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sense, Pr. 1 would be equivalent to: the liquid that we drink, that is in our 
rivers, etc. is the liquid that we drink, that is in our rivers, etc. It would also 
be equivalent to: water is water. In this sense, and this is again Quine’s 
original point, it cannot demonstrate anything (necessary or not) about the 
nature of the world: since Pr. 2 is intended to convey empirical (synthetic) 
knowledge, it is not valid to then substitute into it the definition that this 
reading of Pr. 1 provides us with; i.e., the substitution does not yield the 
empirical (synthetic) knowledge that Pr. 2 is intended to convey.  
 
The problem in a nutshell is then that there is no clear sense in 
which the alleged conceptual necessity of the claim that water = the liquid 
that we drink, that is in our rivers, etc., can help us to determine the 
ontological necessity of water being H2O. 
There is yet another reason to deny the notion that conceptual 
truths play an essential or indispensable role in metaphysical knowledge: 
natural language is not our only, nor even our best, way to grasp 
metaphysical ideas. There are other languages that perhaps, or for certain 
people, are better ways of expressing and understanding metaphysical 
facts. For example, the sculptor Oteiza can show the metaphysical nature 
of space as emptiness, or as a pure relation created by matter, as well as 
any philosopher of physics who denies that space is a Cartesian 
receptacle can.  
Kripke insisted that the thesis that identical objects are necessarily 
identical is one of the “(self-evident) theses of philosophical logic independent 
of natural language.” [(1980), p. 4; my italics]. The thesis that identity is 
necessary, where identity is a relation of objects, is not analytic in 
character, nor does it depend on natural language. In general, Jackson’s 
scheme should be replaced by something like the following: 
 
(I) Any entity is necessarily identical to itself.  
    [a priori]  
 
(i) If water is identical to H2O, then water is necessarily H2O. 
    [a priori]  
 
(ii) Water is H2O.  
     [a posteriori] 
 
So, (iii) Water is necessarily H2O. 
            [a posteriori] 
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Identity is a necessary relation. So any true identity statement, such as 
“water is H2O”, is necessarily true. But it is not analytically or 
conceptually true that identity is a necessary relation. It is evident in itself 
that no entity can be another. However, the reason for and understanding 
of this self-evident thesis of philosophical logic that is independent of 
natural language are still to be elucidated.  
 
 
III. METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS 
 
Metaphysics seems to be concerned with knowledge of highly ab-
stract philosophical categories. I have more or less restricted the discussion 
to identity up until now, but there are many others: causality, time, space, 
existence, the self, natural law, substance, beauty, and so on. So meta-
physics is not concerned with terms such as ‘water’, ‘energy’, ‘tempera-
ture’, ‘tigers’, ‘ships’, and so on – except in the trivial sense that they are 
examples or case studies of the categories themselves. To mention again 
the most hackneyed case, metaphysical considerations concerning ‘water’ 
are metaphysical considerations of identity. And when it comes to the 
study of the modality they convey, the study of categories involves ab-
straction from their empirical content and exemplification. 
Categories govern all things or facts in the world, and over all pos-
sible things and possible facts. Thus, the principles that govern catego-
ries seem to be that kind of truths, or apparent truths, that present 
themselves to us, not just as true, but also as involving some sort of modali-
ty: it is not that there is a sufficient reason for everything, but that there 
must be one; not only that entities exist in the world, but that their exist-
ence is contingent; that causation is a necessary relation; that every tem-
poral thing must exist at some present; that nothing can be bad but 
beautiful; and so on. Metaphysics searches for modal truths that are ulti-
mate principles of reality.  
However, modal knowledge, in metaphysics as much as in any oth-
er discipline which aspires to attaining it, is a priori knowledge. Even if 
particular instantiations of modal truths can be known a posteriori, they 
rest upon a priori modal truths. The usual reason behind the idea that 
modal knowledge is a priori is that empirical experience is always subject 
to error: empirical experience can deceive us, so it cannot be the source 
of necessary knowledge. I think this reason is highly misleading. Error is 
part of human nature, just the same.  
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The true reason why necessity must be known a priori is that no in-
stance of empirical knowledge can provide for the modo of reality. Empir-
ical generality cannot provide necessity: no matter how many crows you 
count, although you may come to know empirically their actual number, 
you can never how many there must be. Neither can any empirical fact 
provide for contingency: you count twenty crows, but neither the result, 
nor your counting itself, will tell you that there could have been fewer, or 
more, or none. Empirical knowledge provides you with facts; but it cannot 
tell you whether those facts are contingent or not. So, if some facts are al-
so modal in character, if modal knowledge is possible at all, knowledge of 
their modo must be a priori. The problem of course is how to determine the 
sort of a priori access that is required for knowledge of modality.  
 
 
IV. ON CONCEIVABILITY 
 
The popular view sees conceivability as our a priori epistemological 
access to modality. It holds that whatever is conceivable – and it is presupposed 
that nothing that is logically impossible is conceivable – is possible. Thus, 
necessity resides where its contradictory cannot be conceived. But what is it 
to conceive? To think? To understand? To imagine?  
If we want to distinguish between imagination and understanding, 
for instance in Cartesian terms of images versus concepts/ideas, then the 
notion that conceivability is our guide to possibility means that our 
understanding, but not our imagination, is what properly conceives. For 
there are too many ideas whose images the imagination cannot form, but 
that are clearly possible. We can imagine a figure of ten or perhaps 
twenty sides and understand the corresponding ideas; but even if we 
possess and understand the concept, we cannot imagine a figure of 
infinite sides. The idea of being infinite is perfectly coherent, and it is 
even a possibility that our universe is infinite in time or space; but we 
cannot form this possibility in our imagination. There are possibilities 
that our imagination cannot imagine. So our understanding, but not our 
imagination, is the proper guide to possibility.  
However, it is not easy to make sense of the distinction between 
imagination and understanding in terms of images versus concepts. When 
good poetry makes a stronger impression on us than painting, as it usually 
does, do the words impress our imagination, or our understanding? Is this 
strong impression caused by concepts, or by the images that the words on 
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the paper signify or provoke in our minds? Just by way of an example, 
consider the description of Satan given by Milton:  
 
… His form had yet not lost 
All her original brightness, nor appeared 
Less than archangel ruined, and th’excess 
Of glory obscured: as when the sun new risen 
Looks through the horizontal misty air 
Shorn of his beams; or from behind the moon 
In dim eclipse disastrous twilight sheds 
On half the nations, and with fear of change 
Perplexes monarchs, …  
 
Can you tell the difference between imagining and conceptually 
conceiving Satan? Powerful and confused images or ideas absorb the 
mind when we read or hear this passage and experience the sinister 
nature it conjures up. Our minds are clearly moved, but by blurred 
images? By obscure concepts? I think these are the wrong questions. 
The question concerning our knowledge of metaphysical necessity 
cannot be resolved by deciding the medium – images, concepts, 
propositions – we use for metaphysical thinking, because the old formula 
(whatever is conceivable is possible) is simply false. Whether it is in the 
form of images, concepts, propositions, or whatever, we clearly can 
conceive what is impossible. We can conceive that water is not H2O; we 
can conceive that we can demonstrate (Kant did) that the universe had a 
beginning and that it had no beginning, that π is not 3.1416, and so on. 
Conceivability, irrespective of the medium that is needed for conceiving, 
is just not the guide to modal knowledge. 
Many still insist that conceivability leads to possibility. Situations of 
modal error, they say, are situations where the link between conceivability 
and possibility seems to break down. It seems to break down, but it does 
not. For when we are supposedly guilty of modal error, in fact we are 
mistaking some different imaginary/conceptual/ propositional situation, 
a fake, for the real one. When we make a modal mistake, we conceive a 
different situation from the one that the evaluated sentence seems to 
represent. But conceivability and possibility still go hand in hand: there is 
some privileged proposition that shows the appropriate a priori truth 
that is “always” necessarily true.  
Chalmers (2004) explains the conceivable situation that water is 
XYZ in the following way. There are epistemically possible worlds where 
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water, i.e., the liquid we drink to survive, is XYZ. These worlds are 
metaphysically impossible because we, in our world, have discovered that 
water is H2O. But ‘water’ picks out other entities (such as XYZ) at other 
possible worlds. If we keep the referent of ‘water’ fixed in our world, 
worlds where water is not H2O are counterfactually impossible. But they 
are still possible, for we could have discovered that the liquid we drink to 
survive, etc. had a different composition. Our world could then have 
been a world where water is XYZ. There is no contradiction in this. Our 
mind misleads us, but not because we imagine or conceive the 
impossible. Our mind misleads us because what we conceive and what is 
the case are different things. When we conceive that water is not H2O, 
what we conceive is the different, but similar enough, situation in which 
a certain liquid, which has the usual macroscopic properties that water 
has, is XYZ. Equally, when we conceive that the Sun is a god, what we 
conceive is the different, but similar enough, situation in which the 
celestial body that is big and yellow and was believed to rotate around 
the Earth is a deity. We conceive through true properties, or descriptions 
of the entity in question, but somehow we lose sight of the true referent 
of these descriptions: we are not really thinking of the entity that is our 
water, the Sun, etc., but of some other entity that could have had many 
of the contingent but salient properties or our water, our Sun, and so on. 
If this view is correct, to conceive that it could have been the case that 
the Sun is a god, is to conceive that some sun-like body, but not the Sun, 
is a deity. I think this is simply wrong.  
Metaphysics is not primarily concerned with what sentences would, 
or could, say in different situations, or under different uses of language; 
but with the ontological commitments of true sentences. For Chalmers, 
when we conceive the negation of a true, necessary statement, such a 
conception does not convey to us that the corresponding fact is not the 
case; rather, the statement acquires a different meaning and some fake 
fact takes the place of the original one. This is a high price indeed to pay 
for hanging on to the conceivability-entails-possibility thesis. To be sure, 
it is possible that ‘water’ (the term or its intension) is used to refer to 
some other stuff. It is also possible that our cognitive faculties could 
have been different or inexistent. It is possible that most of the proper-
ties that water has, being contingent, could have belonged to some other 
stuff that is not water. These are possible, and conceivable, situations; 
but these possibilities are not what we conceive when we conceive that 
water is not H2O.  
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Metaphysical impossibilities are conceivable. I can imagine that the 
Sun is a god. I can conceive that cats are demons and people are 
Martians in disguise. I can conceive that an omnipotent God can create a 
stone that She cannot move. I can dream that I am my beautiful sister. I 
can imagine, like Kripke, that the ducks in Central Park are demons. I 
can suppose that Achilles actually walked, in a finite time, an infinite 
number of steps before he caught up with the tortoise. I can conceive 
these situations – as others can – but, of course, some of them at least 
are metaphysically impossible. 
Imagination or conceivability is neither proof of possibility nor a 
limit to necessity. But why? This is my guess: modality, including 
metaphysical modality, is no content of thought, but its condition. 
Modality is a priori because it belongs to the framework of thought and 
experience, as much as it belongs to the framework and conditions of 
reality. Necessity, or possibility, cannot be revealed through any kind of 
empirical research into the world, because it belongs in the ultimate 
categories that are the very conditions for experience, and language, and 
thinking.  
 
 
V. THE REALM OF PURE REASON 
 
So where does the a priori guide to metaphysical principles reside? 
If modality is not within the scope of experience, of imagination, if it is 
not the content of thought or meaning, if it belongs to the framework 
and condition of experience itself, then metaphysical objects and 
principles must be intuitions, or intuited. So there is an intimate, 
immediate, awareness of modality. Intuitions are insights that guide the 
activity of our imagination, our senses and, in general, our knowledge 
and thinking. This intrusion into the activity of thought and language is 
not propositional or conceptual– even though, after being noticed or 
acknowledged, it could become part of propositional content. Kant 
wrote, on mathematical knowledge: 
 
A new light flashed upon the mind of the first man who demonstrated the 
properties of the isosceles triangle. The true method, so he found, was not 
to inspect what he discerned either in the figure, or in the bare concept of 
it, and from this, as it were, to read off its properties; but to bring out 
what was necessarily implied in the concepts that he had himself formed a 
priori [Critique of Pure Reason Bxii]. 
 
90                                                                                M. J. García Encinas 
 
This new light that flashed upon the mind of, perhaps, Thales, this kind 
of knowledge, is immediate and, like empirical knowledge, it is a kind of 
experience. Intuition is Thales’ experience that the content of his math-
ematical finding could not be otherwise, and the experience that every-
body else should experience this feeling of necessity when entertaining 
the same content of thought.  
In contrast to imagination, perception or propositional thought, in-
tuition does not “produce” representations, images, concepts or 
thoughts. To intuit is not to imagine something, nor to conceive a situa-
tion, nor to know empirically by sense or introspection. Intuition of mo-
dality is a feeling; and what is felt is not a proposition but a modo. When 
intuited, necessity is not inferred or deduced, but experienced. And the 
subject who experiences it experiences that the thought is necessary, and 
that everybody else – even Descartes’ Polyandro – must have the same 
feeling, the same intellectual vision when entertaining the same thought. 
It is not an experience reserved for special people: no rare power of the 
understanding, but a common function of reason on a par with, but not 
identifiable with, common sense.  
In the Regulae, Descartes said that in mathematical reasoning we 
find reason at its best: beginning with self-evident data, reason reaches 
conclusions with certainty following a deductive process of self-evident 
steps from data to data. Thus, deduction and intuition are both powers 
of reason. Deduction is the active power to move by an uninterrupted 
sequence of self-evident steps, from data to their consequents. Intuition 
is the passive power of apprehending self-evident data.  
Philosophical intuition is to see, for instance, that self-consciousness, 
even by momentary doubt, necessarily implies existence. It is to see that 
self-identity is necessary; that necessarily Pa  x Px; that every particu-
lar effect necessitates its cause; that existence is contingent; that torture 
should not happen; that time needs change; and so on. These pure ap-
prehensions of reason primarily concern fundamental philosophical cat-
egories of existence, causation, time, the person, the good, etc.4, 5. 
Categories are not primarily concepts. Self-identity, for instance, is a 
metaphysical relation, or perhaps a property. It is a metaphysical category 
that belongs in reality and into which the natural light of reason can pen-
etrate and apprehend. Thus, intuition, at least when doing its job for 
metaphysics, deals directly with its abstract “objects” or philosophical 
categories and perceives their nature. 
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You cannot deny an intuition, which is an act of reason, even if you 
can deny its propositional content. So, to deny an intuition is not to have 
a feeling of counterintuitiveness [contra Williamson (2007), pp. 218-219]; 
intuitions are only elliptically deniable. You can deny that identity is nec-
essary, or the rule of modus ponens, for instance; but when doing so, 
your reason actively denies a proposition and it does so through much ef-
fort. Certainly, much philosophical work is achieved by actively denying 
or confronting intuitions; so much that you could say that philosophy is 
often a “mere” purging of intuitions.  
BonJour has also argued that a priori metaphysical knowledge con-
sists of direct or immediate insight into modality. He claims that “a priori 
justification occurs when the mind directly or intuitively sees or grasps or 
apprehends … a necessary fact about the nature or structure of reality.” 
[BonJour (1998), pp. 15-6]. My rephrasing of this: a priori metaphysical 
knowledge is rational insight into the categories and deep modal struc-
tures in the world. Many of BonJour’s claims, including the fallibility of in-
tuition, are in the spirit of what I am proposing here. 
 
 
VI. ON THE FALLIBILITY OF INTUITION 
 
There is a crucial point that I have not mentioned yet: the idea that 
a priori knowledge is subject to correction. It is almost universally as-
sumed that a priori knowledge cannot be mistaken; after all, it is the 
source of necessary truths. This assumption explains why mathematical 
and logical reasoning and principles are immediately considered as possi-
ble instances of a priori knowledge. However, I think there is a danger-
ous misunderstanding here.  
The realm of the a priori is the realm of modality. But let us focus 
here on necessary truths, as it is their necessity that grounds the idea that 
a priori knowledge is infallible. I claim that necessary truths, or the nec-
essary truths upon which other a posteriori necessary truths depend, can 
only be reached a priori. But a priori routes are not routes of certainty. 
To know a priori is to know by intuition: it is to experience that a 
thought cannot but be the case, and that everybody who is in the same 
state of thought must have the same experience of necessity. But, of 
course, the experience could be felt when the propositional content of 
the thought is not necessary, or even true: intuition can go wrong.  
We have the conviction that identity is necessary. We strongly feel 
the need for a time before today. We feel that tigers are necessarily ani-
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mals; that 1+1 is necessarily 2. But we could be wrong. Perhaps the dis-
tinction between genus and species does not belong in the world; perhaps 
only the present is real; perhaps there are no entities in the world; perhaps 
we have to change our arithmetic. These ideas are farfetched in the ex-
treme (that is why we experience them as necessarily false), but they 
could be right. New data, the development of new scientific theories, the 
discovery of inconsistency with other a priori principles and, in the end, 
the development of philosophy, could make us understand that their ne-
cessity was an illusion. A priori knowledge of necessity is not necessary 
knowledge; and knowledge is not necessary because it is a priori known. 
To know a priori is to have the intuition that something is so and so of 
necessity; but our intuition can fail just as any other of our faculties can. 
Tradition disagrees, and the idea that pure reason cannot fail to 
think properly is old enough. Even the sceptic refrains from questioning 
this capability of pure reason. And I agree that there is something in this: 
one cannot doubt everything, for even doubt must be coherent. You can 
doubt tertio excluso, the rule of existential generalization, modus ponens, 
etc., but only insofar as you count on something which you do not 
doubt. Otherwise, you will simply be unable to make a single claim. This, 
however, is all there is to the infallibility of reason, also in its passive 
power to intuit. That you cannot doubt everything does not imply that 
pure reason is infallible. 
Descartes was well aware of the impossibility of doubting every-
thing. However, he also believed that intuition cannot go wrong. Des-
cartes understood that he could doubt mostly everything; he thought he 
could doubt any information provided through his senses, up to the 
point of being uncertain as to whether he was dreaming or not. He even 
seemed to consider the possibility of a malignant demon that deceived 
him in his mathematical thinking, in the First Meditation, and again in the 
Third: 
 
Indeed, if I have judged since that these things [any and every simple and 
easy matter in arithmetic and geometry, such as, for example, that two and 
three make five, and other similar matters] can be doubted, it has been for 
no other reason than because it occurred to me that a God might perhaps 
have given me a nature such that I might make mistakes even concerning 
the things which seem the most obvious to me. (…) And on the other 
hand, every time I turn towards things which I think I conceive clearly, I 
am so persuaded of their truth that I spontaneously declare: let him deceive 
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me who may, but he shall never be able to cause me to be nothing, so long 
as I think that I am something.” [Third Meditation, pp. 114-5.] 
 
Did Descartes consider the possibility of being deceived in all his 
“certainties,” including all his intuitions? No. There was the indubitable 
intuition that he exists if he can doubt everything else. Had he doubted 
all intuitions, he could not have had any first certainty: he would have 
never written that, even if deceiving him, the demon could not have 
stopped him knowing that he existed. He could never have stated the 
Cogito. So Descartes is implicitly saying here that intuition, the natural 
light of reason, is the most powerful tool that people possess in their 
search for knowledge: more powerful than deduction;6 more powerful 
even than the principle of non-contradiction [Descartes, La recherche, p. 
91]. For even the principle of non-contradiction is known to be certain 
by the natural light of reason.7  
So the malignant demon did not deceive Descartes in all his 
intuitions. As is well known, Descartes concluded from the experience of 
and reflection on the Cogito that intuition, the light of reason, was the 
light of certainty. But this was his mistake. For even if there must be 
some certain knowledge without which one cannot even begin to think, 
and even if intuition is our best tool to attain this foundational 
knowledge, nothing here guarantees that intuition is infallible. If nothing 
else does, the history of philosophy, of logic and of mathematics 
demonstrates how the very best of minds can be mistaken in the most 
certainly felt intuitions. 
 
 
VII. WIT 
 
There is a repeatedly alluded to difficulty concerning intuition in 
metaphysics: the mystery that seemingly surrounds a kind of knowledge 
that, being about our world, is at the same time independent of empirical 
experience. As Devitt (2005) wonders, what sort of non-empirical link to 
reality could support insights into its necessary character?  
I do not think that this activity is more mysterious than many other 
common activities of human beings, and even of other animals. We hear 
bells, we love and hate people, we know that yesterday we ate grapes for 
lunch; and we are conscious of doing all these things. Are these experi-
ences, feelings, and actions of ours really less mysterious than intuition?  
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Throughout this paper I have claimed that modal metaphysical 
knowledge is, ultimately, a priori. A posteriori knowledge of necessary or 
contingent facts, such as that Hesperus is Phosphorus, that Sandy must 
not hurt Pandy, or that Rufo is a contingent being, rests on a sort of a 
priori knowledge that finally concerns old metaphysical categories, such 
as identity, the good, the person, existence, etc., and relations between 
them. Modal metaphysical knowledge is a priori and concerned with 
highly abstract philosophical categories, because there is no way in which 
empirical experience of particular entities, such as Hesperus, or particular 
facts, such as there is cat, can provide for their modal properties. You 
cannot know that cats cannot be demons by observing particular cats; 
you could at most know that no cat is a demon – although of course, 
empirical experience alone does not allow you to state this negative or 
universal fact either. Modality is a feature in the world; but we are not 
aware of it by observing nude particulars. You can be empirically aware 
of the fact that you are writing on a table, but no empirical experience in-
forms you of the fact that you could be writing in some other place, or 
not writing. There can be no empirical knowledge of the contingency of 
the fact that you are writing. You can also learn necessary truths by expe-
rience or a posteriori, as when a child learns multiplication tables or the 
Ten Commandments by memory; but then the child is not learning that 
these truths are necessary. Modal understanding can only be attained by 
natural reason.  
I have also insisted that the job of reason, when reason is applied to 
knowledge of categories, is not merely conceptual. It is not by analysing 
the concept of water, or demon, that reason understands the modal fea-
tures of water or demons; but analysing the category–concept of identity, 
or species, or existence does not take reason much further. In the first 
pages of this paper I tried to stress Quine’s important point that there is 
no way you can get metaphysical modal knowledge from knowledge of 
conceptual truths without confounding modal predicates with statement 
operators. Then I tried to show that imagination and conceivability, at 
least as usually understood, cannot lead to modal knowledge either. In 
general, analyticity and the activity of imagination, traditionally the two 
main empiricist routes chosen to account for modality, are unsatisfactory. I 
then proposed intuition as the “passive” activity of reason which grasps 
the modal character of reality.  
Returning for a moment to imagination and conceivability, it seems 
to me that the idolatry of these activities of the mind by the empiricists 
of the seventieth century is responsible of their overuse. They were be-
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lieved to be capable of finding new relations among ideas, revealing new 
ideas from old ideas and impressions, explaining sympathy and moral at-
titudes, and accounting for artistic creativity. Although I cannot go into 
this point in depth here, this abuse of imagination was as harmful for 
metaphysics as it was for ethics or, especially, aesthetics; it provoked an 
almost unbridgeable breach between reason and the world. However, we 
face up to the world by reasoning as much as by sense experiences. And 
when the former occurs, intuition is one of our preferred capacities that 
we bring to work. Given his intellectual position, unaware of the domi-
nant role that imagination was playing in philosophy and art, the Spanish 
monk Baltasar Gracián proposed an a priori activity of the mind which, 
being rational but not logical, was the source and explanation of human 
creativity. He called it ‘wit’. I want to claim that the capacity of intuition 
is none other than this wit of Gracián’s. Gracián claimed that when wit 
joins normal thinking, including logical activity, the result is vigorous un-
derstanding. Wit is creativity; a capacity that allows the mind to reach its 
highest achievements. It is the stimulus of thought, so it does not belong 
in imagination; but it is the aid of understanding, and the stimulus of rea-
son and conceptual thinking. Wit is the light that comes to the mind 
when it sees something it had not seen before, when it grasps a thought or 
a fact. It is the foremost intellectual quality of the human being. It is the 
aid of the genius. And even if there are no rules for wit – if there were, it 
would not be wit, but active reasoning and deduction – it can be recog-
nized, and educated, and improved through practice. Thus, even if it is 
not a necessary condition for wit, competence in a given field, be it 
mathematics, logic, art, or philosophy, will most certainly improve the 
capacity for rational insight concerning matters in that field. 
We are all familiar with this capacity. Think of any idea that you 
wish someone to believe. You will present to them with all kind of rea-
sons, arguments and explanations so that they can understand and accept 
your idea. But, as necessary or useful as all of them could be for your 
purpose, no kind of reason that you might come up with, no reasoning 
whatsoever, logical, conceptual, by example, by comparison, citing facts, 
etc. will constitute the other person’s understanding: the light that will il-
luminate their mind when they finally see and accept what you mean. 
That is rational intuition.8  
Wit, rational insight, is the capacity to see new “conceptual” rela-
tions, to grasp and intellectually experience the nature of and corre-
spondences between abstract objects and categories, and thus, to realize 
the modal character and categorical structure of reality. Rational insight, 
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not imagination, conceivability or linguistic competence, fallible as it 
might be, constitutes our only possible understanding of the modal char-
acter of reality.9  
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NOTES 
 
1 There are different places where Kripke directly comments on this: “All 
the cases of the necessary a posteriori advocated in the text have the special 
character attributed to mathematical statements: Philosophical analysis tells us 
that they cannot be contingently true, so any empirical knowledge of their truth is 
automatically empirical knowledge that they are necessary. This characterization 
applies, in particular, to the cases of identity statements and of essence. It may give 
a clue to a general characterization of a posteriori knowledge of necessary truths” 
[Kripke (1980), p. 159.]. See also Kripke (1971), p. 88; Kripke (1980), pp. 109 & 
138; or my García-Encinas (2012) which this paper aims to follow on from and 
extend. 
2 For instance, Boghossian (1996) defends a different type of analyticity, 
which he calls epistemic analyticity, for a priori knowledge. In epistemic analyt-
icity, knowledge of meaning is knowledge of truth; but meaning is not conven-
tional: it includes different items from empirical experience. For Peacocke 
(1988), there is a kind of a priori knowledge for which understanding the con-
cepts is enough to know that the sentence is true, but meaning is truth-
conditional rather than conventional. Hawthorne (2006) argues that deciding on 
the best metalanguage, where analytical truths are established, amounts to decid-
ing between the different possible meanings of the quantifier; thus providing for 
its objectual reading, and for the ontological or metaphysical commitments of 
our theories about the world. These, and other contemporary views on analytici-
ty, are considered in depth in Gendler & Hawthorne (2002). 
3 It was Quine again, in his (1953) “Three grades of modal involvement,” 
who once more provided the clues that led to the acknowledgement of this im-
possibility. 
4 Categories are close to what Bealer has called semantically stable terms. 
However, he seems to understand categories as a special kind of concepts. He 
writes that “an expression is semantically stable iff, necessarily, in any language 
group in an epistemic situation qualitatively identical to ours, the expression 
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would mean the same thing.” [Bealer (1996), p. 134; my italics.] This seems to im-
ply that intuitive knowledge of the principles that govern the categories would 
be conceptual knowledge, and I disagree. Intuitive knowledge could turn into 
propositional knowledge and, given its peculiarities, it is not rare for categories 
to become semantic stable terms, but their universality is not primarily explained 
through conceptual reasons but by pure rational insight. 
5 Thus, intuition does not depend on definition or analytic/conceptual 
truths. As Descartes claimed, advancing the main form of what would be 
Quine’s circularity argument against analyticity, definitions cannot provide 
knowledge. If someone were to say that the body is, by definition, a corporeal 
substance, or that a person is a rational animal, or an animated body, they would 
have said nothing without again defining animated body, or rational animal, or 
corporeal substance; and, in this way, from one single question, we would fall 
unwittingly into an infinite number of others. [La recherche, p. 80; Second Medita-
tion, p. 104]. 
6 This would be a nice interpretation of the words in a letter to Mersenne 
of 15 April 1630, where Descartes writes that “at least I think I have found a 
means of providing metaphysical truths in a more evident way than one can give 
a demonstration in Geometry” [Beck (1952), p. 9]. 
7 So Markie (1998) is right in arguing that the Cogito is not a deduction, but 
an intuition. The intuition in the Cogito is Descartes’ immediately grasping and 
feeling that he exists due to the simultaneously intuited premise that he doubts; 
and his experience that everybody else should experience the same feeling when 
entertaining the same thought. 
8 I cannot provide a comparative account of the faculty of rational intuition 
as I am proposing it to be, with the different uses of “intuition” in contemporary 
analytic philosophy, most of which are ordinary, non-philosophical uses of the 
term – including cases in which intuition is appealed to for the acceptance of 
important philosophical theses. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions to this: 
one, which I have already mentioned, can be found in Lawrence BonJour; an-
other in Charles Parsons (1980). Even if their work focuses on other fields of 
intuition, in induction or mathematics, both of their proposals share with mine 
the important point that intuitions are acts of reason and not propositions or 
part of the conceptual content of thoughts or images. Thus, following 
Chudnoff’s (2011) classification of perceptualist versus doxasticist views on in-
tuition, I would align myself with the former.  
9 This paper was written thanks to the financial help received from the 
project FFI2011-29834-C03-02, sponsored by the Spanish Ministry of Educa-
tion. I am very grateful to people at different meetings in Granada and Oporto, 
where I presented some of these ideas. I also thank an anonymous referee for 
this journal for having suggested to me a paper by Symons (2008) which offers a 
clarification of different contemporary uses of intuition in the literature. 
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